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The Long Tail of World War II
Jus Post Bellum in Contemporary East Asia
Timothy Webster*
I. Introduction
The shadow of World War II still looms over East Asia. As in the West, formal hostilities 
ended in 1945. But unlike the West, issues of state accountability, corporate liability, and 
individual reparation roil the victims, governments, and civil society organizations of the 
region. The events of the 1930s and 1940s still form a critical, often controversial, backdrop 
for international relations among China, Japan, Korea, and other Asian nations.1 In the past 
twenty- five years, numerous diplomatic and popular initiatives have undertaken to lessen 
the tensions that World War II still stokes. This chapter examines the contribution that civil 
litigation is making towards resolving the tensions, recreating historical memory, and ac-
knowledging the massive human rights violations of World War II.
Western readers may be familiar with the Holocaust litigation, a catch- all term to de-
scribe a series of transnational lawsuits brought in the US and Europe. Beginning in the 
mid- 1990s, victims of World War II sued European governments and multinational cor-
porations for war crimes ranging from forced labour to seized assets.2 Tellingly, the lawsuits 
themselves did not bring about a resolution; they found for defendants, leaving victim- 
plaintiffs in the same position they had been. The lawsuits did, however, prod political 
actors, on both sides of the Atlantic, to focus on these issues. By 2001, government- brokered 
settlement funds and other mechanisms had resolved most of these issues.3 Though imper-
fect, these settlements afforded victims of serious World War II crimes a measure of recon-
ciliation after more than half a century.
A very different scenario has unfolded in East Asia. Since 1990, well over one hundred 
lawsuits stemming from the war have been filed in China, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Western New England University.
 1 Most historians date World War II in Europe from 1939 to 1945. In China, World War II usually dates from 
1937, with the initiation of full- scale war against Japan.
 2 See e.g. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1196 (CD Cal. 2001); Re Holocaust Victim Assets 
Lit., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139 (EDNY 2000); Burger- Fischer v. Degussa, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248 (DNJ 1999) (slave labour and 
seized gold from concentration camp victims); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (DNJ 1999) (slave la-
bour in Ford’s German factory); LG (Dist Ct) Bremen, 1 O 2889/ 90 (1998) (cited in Iwanona, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 441); 
Krakauer v. Federal Republic of Germany, LG (Dist. Ct) Bonn, 1 O 134/ 92 (1997) (cited in Iwanona, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 
441) (revoking temporary immunity for German corporations under the 1953 London Debt Agreement).
 3 See generally, Michael Bazyler, Holocaust Justice: The Battle for Restitution in America’s Courts (New York 
University Press 2003). Professor Bazyler examines lawsuits in the US and Europe for various episodes from World 
War II, including art, gold, and other assets looted by Nazis; and slave labour used by German corporations.
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and the US. As with their Western counterparts, Asian plaintiffs sued the government of 
Japan and Japanese corporations for forcible rape, slave labour, massacres, indiscriminate 
bombing, and other war crimes. The sheer number of lawsuits suggests that, for many 
victims, World War II has not been adequately resolved. Insofar as jus post bellum seeks 
to secure a ‘just and lasting peace’ among the parties to conflict, these lawsuits demand a 
re- examination of both World War II, and post- war efforts to bring about reconciliation, 
reconstruction, and reparation. In some sense, these lawsuits call into question the founda-
tions of post- war peace erected by the post- war tribunals.4
This chapter fills an important gap by focusing attention on jus post bellum outside of 
the West. Specifically, the chapter examines the results, motivations, and achievements of 
approximately one hundred World War II reparations lawsuits filed in Japan. In so doing, 
it answers three related questions. First, why does World War II still generate controversy 
in the contemporary geopolitical triangle of China, Japan, and Korea? Second, how does 
litigation contribute to the reconciliation process? Third, what are the future prospects for 
reconciliation in the near future? Before answering these questions, we offer a few remarks 
about jus post bellum, and Asian efforts at reconciliation.
II. Jus Post Bellum
Jus post bellum fuses a set of legal, moral, and philosophical principles to bring about a 
lasting peace after the ravages of war.5 Most scholars would agree with such a generality, 
yet differ in specifying and prioritizing those principles.6 Some understand the task of jus 
post bellum as bringing about political reconciliation, ensuring individuals in war- torn 
countries have the capacity to educate themselves, and building political trust among the 
formerly warring states.7 Some view jus post bellum as an exercise in holding to account 
those most responsible for violating the laws of war.8 Still others direct the inquiry towards 
 4 A few months after the war, Judge Jerome Frank described Nuremberg in the following way: ‘For the main-
tenance of [world] peace a vigorous, organized world order is imperative. The Nuremberg trial signalizes [sic] the 
emergence of such a world order. It furnishes the precedent for a world court ready and able to punish disturbers 
of international peace’. Jerome Frank, ‘Punishment for Today— Precedent for Tomorrow’, (13 Oct. 1945) Collier’s 
Weekly, 11, 73. Recent scholarship acknowledges defects of the post- war tribunals, but still stresses their salience. 
Kirsten Sellars, ‘Imperfect Justice at Nuremberg and Tokyo’ (2010) 21 European Journal of International Law 1085, 
1086 (calling the tribunals ‘the lodestar of international criminal justice’).
 5 See Brian Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum’ (2000) 31 Journal of Social Philosophy 117.Orend lists five guiding prin-
ciples: just cause for termination (aggressor submits to reasonable punishment), right intention (i.e. no revenge), 
public declaration by legitimate authority, distinguishing civilians from political and military leaders, and propor-
tionality. Ibid. 128– 9. See also George M. Clifford III, ‘Jus Post Bellum: Foundational Principles and a Proposed 
Model’ (2012) 11 Journal of Military Ethics 42. Clifford also lists five guiding principles:  respect for persons, 
establishing justice (on philosophical grounds), ecological responsibility, multinational commitment, and pro-
gress towards closure. Ibid. 45– 55.
 6 See Jennifer S. Easterday, Jens Iverson, and Carsten Stahn, ‘Exploring the Normative Foundations of Jus Post 
Bellum: An Introduction’, in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday, and Jens Iverson (eds), Jus Post Bellum: Mapping 
the Normative Foundation (Oxford University Press 2014).
 7 See Colleen Murphy and Linda Reznik, ‘Jus Post Bellum and Political Reconciliation’, in Larry May and 
Elizabeth Edenberg (eds), Jus Post Bellum & Transitional Justice (Cambridge University Press 2015). In this 
account, political reconciliation would include inter alia the establishment of trust between the warring states, and 
individual’s trust in the state.
 8 Michael Walzer, Just & Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (Basic Books 2006) 288 
(‘There can be no justice in war if there are not, ultimately, responsible men and women’).
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truth- telling, believing that the denial and obfuscation that follow conflicts often hinder 
longer- term prospects for reconciliation.9 On the other hand, some scholars doubt that jus 
post bellum amounts to a coherent legal concept, preferring instead to focus on existing 
legal regimes such as human rights law or the law of war.10
Since each conflict, and its ultimate resolution, is to some extent sui generis, scholars 
struggle to articulate the precise parameters of the field of jus post bellum. Nevertheless, 
Larry May and Elizabeth Edenberg have gleaned six principles that serve as a useful starting 
point: retribution, reconciliation, rebuilding, restitution, reparations, and proportionality.11 
To some extent, these principles overlap and interact with each other. Proportionality 
only makes sense by balancing one principle against another. Likewise, reconciliation re-
quires some combination of restitution, reparation, retribution, and perhaps rebuilding. 
In other words, these categories may not be wholly distinct from one another. Moreover, 
these principles lavish attention on the state, arguably at the expense of victims. For ex-
ample, retribution— holding accountable those most responsible for initiating or waging 
unjust war— usually requires a criminal trial, and by extension the resources and judicial 
machinery that only states possess. Rebuilding, likewise, hinges upon the deployment of 
resources normally available only to states, as the post- war reconstruction of Germany and 
Japan suggest.12
Tribunals, a key institution in many post- war reconciliation processes, promote this 
state- centric view. Certainly the post- war tribunals (Nuremberg and Tokyo) focused on 
state matters, prosecuting a narrow band of high- level government officials and military 
officers. The Tokyo Tribunal in particular devoted more attention to crimes against peace 
(preparing, initiating, and waging war) than it did to crimes against humanity (murder, 
enslavement, civilian killings, etc.).13 As criminal tribunals, these institutions focused on 
the planning and perpetration of crimes, at the expense of examining the damage or de-
struction caused thereby. This has prompted scholars to criticize the Tokyo Tribunal for 
neglecting the devastation suffered by Asian victims.14
By contrast, jus post bellum directs attention towards the needs of individual victims, 
as it is ‘their society that is going to be constructed in the name of just and stable peace’.15 
Post- war reconciliation mechanisms must attend to the destruction, suffering, and damage 
caused by war, and the lives crushed thereunder. The guiding inquiry must protect and ul-
timately ‘empower the civilian population’.16 More broadly, jus post bellum asks how to undo 
 9 Cindy Holder, ‘Truthfulness in Transition: The Value of Insisting on Experiential Adequacy’, in Larry May and 
Elizabeth Edenberg (eds), Jus Post Bellum & Transitional Justice (Cambridge University Press 2015).
 10 Eric De Brabandere, ‘The Responsibility for Conflict Reforms: A Critical Assessment of Jus Post Bellum as a 
Legal Concept’ (2010) 43 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 119, 149.
 11 Larry May and Elizabeth Edenberg, ‘Introduction’, in Larry May and Elizabeth Edenberg (eds), Jus Post 
Bellum and Transitional Justice (Cambridge University Press 2015) 3– 6.
 12 Ibid. 5.
 13 Yuma Totani, ‘The Case against the Accused’, in Yuki Tanaka, Tim McCormack, and Gerry Simpson (eds), 
Beyond Victor’s Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal Revisited (Brill 2010) 147.
 14 Yuma Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II (Harvard 2009). 
Totani notes, inter alia, the Allied prosecutors’ failure to investigate Japan’s (i) medical experiments on Chinese 
subjects (Unit 731), (ii) war crimes against Koreans and Taiwanese (who were then Japanese colonial subjects), 
and (iii) use of poisonous gas in China. Ibid. 248– 50. She also cites the ‘blanket immunity’ that Western powers 
extended to prevent scrutiny of wrong- doing against their own colonial subjects in Southeast Asia.
 15 See Inger Österdahl, ‘The Gentle Modernizer of the Law of Armed Conflict?’, in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. 
Easterday, and Jens Iverson (eds), Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundation (Oxford University Press 
2014) 207, 219.
 16 Ibid. 220.
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the devastation of war, to rebuild broken societies, and to restore rule of law.17 This requires 
broad reflection on the types of damage visited upon civilians: property damage, sexual as-
sault, forced labour, physical violence, and other ills.
Jus post bellum also has an important normative component. War efforts often involve 
propaganda efforts to demonize the enemy, whip up nationalist sentiment, and exaggerate 
differences between people. Post- war peace processes must reorient social norms away 
from antagonism and hatred, and towards co- operation and cohabitation.18 This normative 
inquiry may very well change over time, as more information about the causes, conduct, and 
consequences of the war emerge. It is doubtful that a single ‘truth’, satisfactory to all parties, 
will emerge.19 Instead, victims, historians, politicians, and activists will advance different, 
even contradictory, narratives about the causes of war, and apportion blame accordingly.
A final question involves the temporal limits of jus post bellum. When does the post- war 
period end, exactly? Most agree that jus post bellum begins when military hostilities end, 
even if it may be difficult to pinpoint that precise moment in time.20 But when does it end? 
Scholars propose several possible dates for any given war, but recognize that the inquiry is, 
ultimately, subjective.21 It hinges upon the actors, the situation, the measures, and subse-
quent reception by the international community.22 Post- war settings have accommodated 
various mechanisms to build towards a sustainable peace. Regional integration, alleviation 
of racial tensions, compensation schema, and constitutional amendments have signified the 
end of the post- war period.23 But there is neither a set formula, nor a single time frame, by 
which to demarcate ‘post- war’. This helps explain why we are still discussing World War II 
reparations well into the twenty- first century.
III. Models of Post- Conflict Justice
Various mechanisms of post- war reconciliation have emerged after the Cold War (1990- 
present). Ad hoc international tribunals, resurrected for the first time since World War II, 
presided over war crimes prosecutions concerning Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and 
Cambodia. It is still premature to confirm their impact or legacy, as several are ongoing at 
the time of this writing. Yet these tribunals have clarified jurisdictional principles, narrowed 
 17 Larry May, ‘Jus Post Bellum Proportionality and the Fog of War’ (2003) 24 European Journal of International 
Law 315, 324.
 18 Jennifer S. Easterday, ‘Peace Agreements as a Framework for Jus Post Bellum’, in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. 
Easterday, and Jens Iverson (eds), Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundation (Oxford University Press 
2014) 379, 380.
 19 Cindy Holder (n 9) 248– 9.
 20 For instance, President Bush declared the end of ‘major combat operations in Iraq’ on 1 May 2003. He stood 
before a banner that read ‘Mission Accomplished’ on board the USS Abraham Lincoln. In 2010, the last US combat 
team left Iraq, and President Obama declared an end to the combat mission. In 2017, at the time this chapter was 
written, some 5,000 US troops were stationed in Iraq to fight Islamic State. See Michael R. Gordon, ‘U.S. to Send 
Over 200 More Soldiers to Iraq to Help Retake Mosul’, New York Times (27 March 2017).
 21 See Martin Wählisch, ‘Conflict Termination from a Human Rights Perspective: State Transitions, Power- 
Sharing, and the Definition of the “Post” ’, in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday, and Jens Iverson (eds), Jus Post 
Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundation (Oxford University Press 2014) 316, 330.
 22 Ibid. 331 (listing a series of events from Libya, Lebanon and Bosnia- Herzegovina that signified the end 
of war).
 23 Ibid.
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and reinforced legal doctrines, and ended impunity for some high- ranking officials.24 They 
have also breathed new life into the study of international law (especially international 
criminal law and international humanitarian law), which has in turn spread norms of indi-
vidual accountability across regions, and ultimately around the world.25
Truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs), based in part on South Africa’s experi-
ence, have also formed in Liberia, East Timor, and Guatemala. These institutions collect 
testimony from victims and perpetrators, conduct independent investigations, and issue 
reports to facilitate reconciliation.26 They may also recommend the prosecution of those 
persons most culpable of human rights abuses, or reparations for those peculiarly harmed 
during the conflict.27 While not uncontroversial, TRCs usually provide a comprehensive 
account of the major events of the conflict, thus serving a valuable truth function.
A final, and relatively recent development, involves claims commissions. These institu-
tions hear evidence about ‘loss, damage and injury resulting from the conflict’.28 Thereupon, 
they make awards to civilians, prisoners of wars, and those who suffer the destruction 
or seizure of property. Such institutions have been set up after conflicts such as the Iran 
Hostage Crisis, and wars such as the Eritrean– Ethiopian War.
While each mechanism has its particular strengths and weaknesses, all require enormous 
coordination. The Nuremberg Tribunal, for instance, required months of negotiations 
among four states (UK, US, Soviet Union, and France), each with its own legal traditions, 
modes of criminal procedure, and goals for the tribunal.29 Likewise, the establishment of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in the 1990s required at least nine affirmative votes 
from the fifteen members of the UN Security Council, and none of the Permanent Five 
members to cast a veto.30 Mechanisms such as TRCs similarly demand political will from 
a post- conflict government, and the courage to grapple with a fresh and painful chapter of 
history.31 Claims commissions may require two states, recently at war with one another, to 
come to the table, agree to a set of procedures, and submit to judgments by independent 
parties, often from third states. The rarity of such bilateral claims commissions bespeaks the 
difficulty of getting two sides to sit down and agree to such a mechanism.
 24 The Tadic decision held that international law can apply to internal armed conflict, as long as one govern-
ment controls the military of one party to the dispute. Prosecutor v. Tadic (Judgment) Case No. IT- 94- 1- A (15 July 
1999) para. 137. The ICTR has refined interpretations of genocide, incitement to genocide, and rape.
 25 Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics (Norton 
2011) 5– 6.
 26 The leading examples would be Liberia and Sierra Leone.
 27 South Africa’s TRC proved somewhat unusual in this regard, providing amnesty to those who made full 
disclosure. The expression of remorse was not necessary. Lyn Graybill, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa? 
Miracle or Model (Lynne Rienner 2002) 40.
 28 Michael J. Matheson, ‘Eritrea- Ethiopia Claims Commission: Damage Awards’ (2009) 13 ASIL Insights, <asil.
org/ insights/ volume/ 13/ issue/ 13/ Eritrea- ethiopia- claims- commission- damage- awards>.
 29 Many of these issues were thrashed out in the London Conference, which took place from 26 June to 2 August 
1945. But even in April 1945, Truman had the idea of a tribunal in mind, and approached Justice Robert Jackson 
about serving as a chief prosecutor for the US. See generally Nuremberg Trial, International Military Tribunal, 
1945– 1946, <https:// www.roberthjackson.org/ nuremberg- timeline/ >
 30 All fifteen members of the UNSC voted to establish the ICTY in 1993. See UNSC Res. 827 (1993) UN Doc. S/ 
RES/ 827. Thirteen members of the UNSC voted to establish the ICTR. China abstained and Rwanda voted against 
the resolution. See UNSC Res. 955 (1994) UN Doc. S/ RES/ 955 (1994).
 31 See generally Graybill (n 27) cit. 2– 6. One of the most controversial elements of the TRC was the amnesty 
provisions, the ‘outcome of various compromises that had been hammered out between the African National 
Congress and the National Party in the transition period leading to the adoption of an interim constitution in 
1993, with input from twenty- six political parties’. Ibid. 2.
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What if there is no consensus? States like to put wars behind them, particularly when they 
lose. State actors generally believe they fought for a just cause, and have spent years convin-
cing the public of the reasonability, necessity, even desirability, of the war effort. After the 
war, one state may believe it has already done its penance; the prosecution of war— with its 
casualties, property damage, and civilian privation— may seem like punishment enough. 
Moreover, if the international community is either fractured or reluctant to intercede, both 
distinct possibilities, institutional paralysis may prevail. In this case, individual victims 
cannot reasonably expect an investigation of facts, reparations for property damages, or 
compensation for personal harm they suffered. In such a situation, they may take matters 
into their own hands.
One increasingly common response has been the resort to individual litigation. In the 
West, victims of a range of World War II crimes stepped forward in the 1990s to demand 
restitution of seized assets and property, and various types of reparation.32 These lawsuits did 
not result in compensation awards. But they did set in motion a chain of events that led, ul-
timately, to the establishment of large foundations that compensated thousands of Holocaust 
victims. The Swiss,33 German,34 and Austrian35 settlement funds provided reparation to 
those who had performed unremunerated forced labour, who had their businesses liquid-
ated, who had their assets seized, and many others. These settlement funds offer important 
precedents for resolving the lingering issues of World War II damage. But as with other post- 
war mechanisms, they require co- ordination across borders, diplomatic tact, willingness to 
face dark chapters of a nation’s past, and other attributes. At least in the transatlantic context, 
civil litigation was the spark that brought the companies, and the governments, to the nego-
tiating table.36 This chapter explores the role of litigation in more detail below. But first it is 
helpful to understand the resonance of World War II in contemporary East Asia.
IV. World War II in Contemporary East Asia
World War II still generates controversy over East Asia. Seventy- five years after the war, 
scarcely a year goes by without a potent reminder of the war: another compensation lawsuit, 
 32 ‘Reparations’ is a general term used for redressing gross violations of international law. They may include 
restitution (restoring the victim to their ex ante status, including the return of property), compensation (eco-
nomic loss, including physical and mental harm), rehabilitation (provision of social, medical psychological and 
other services), and satisfaction (measures to ensure non- repetition, return of remains of those killed). See Basic 
Principles & Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, UNGA Res. 60/ 147 (16 Dec. 
2005) UN Doc. A/ RES/ 60/ 147 paras 15– 23.
 33 In August 2000, Swiss banks Credit Suisse and UBS, together with the Swiss government, established a $1.25 
billion fund to repay the accounts the banks had effectively stolen from victims of the Nazi regime. See Bazyler 
(n 3) 35.
 34 The German government— together with German banks, insurers and companies— established a 10 billion 
deutschemark ($5.2 billion) fund in 2000. The redress aimed primarily at slave labourers in German factories, in-
cluding Ford Werke (the German subsidiary of Ford), Siemens, and Daimler- Benz. Bazyler (n 3) 70– 4.
 35 The Austrian government, without support from the private sector, established a $480 million fund in 2000. 
The settlement would pay owners of lost property, liquidated businesses, real estate, bank accounts, insurance 
policies, and so on. See Claims Conference, Austrian General Settlement Fund (GSF), available at <http:// www.
claimscon.org/ about/ history/ closed- programs/ general- settlement- fund> accessed 19 May 2019.
 36 In introducing Germany’s fund, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder stated it would ‘counter lawsuits, particu-
larly class action lawsuits, and to remove the basis of the campaign being led against Germany industry and our 
country’. See Roger Cohen, ‘German Companies Set up Fund’ New York Times (17 Feb. 1999).
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new discovery of war remains, or a controversial revision of the events of the war. In 2018, 
the Supreme Court of South Korea ordered two Japanese multinationals to pay damages 
awards to Korean men and women who performed forced labour during World War II.37 
The decision badly damaged bilateral relations between Seoul and Tokyo, inviting a trade 
war and various diplomatic spats.38 In 2017, a South Korean historian was acquitted in a 
criminal defamation trial for her book, which advanced views about the comfort women 
that were out of step with mainstream Korean ones.39 A year earlier, she lost a civil defam-
ation lawsuit, which ordered her to pay each of nine former comfort women 10 million won 
(8,000 euros) in damages.40 In 2016, Mitsubishi settled a lawsuit filed by dozens of Chinese 
men who had been forced to work in its Japanese factories during the war.41 In 2014, a 
graveyard containing bones of Korean workers who died during the war was discovered in 
Japan.42 In 2013, Prime Minster Abe Shinzo visited Yasukuni Shrine, which honours Japan’s 
war dead, among them fourteen Class- A war criminals.43 His visit provoked condemna-
tions from South Korea and China, which have criticized Japan’s lack of contrition about the 
war.44 Even the US, Japan’s long- time ally, offered a rare rebuke of Abe’s visit.45
During decennial anniversaries of the war— 2015, 2005, 1995— the atmosphere is par-
ticularly tense, as a new set of remembrances, reinterpretations, and recriminations un-
folds.46 On the seventieth anniversary of Japan’s surrender— 14 August 2015— Prime 
Minister Abe made a wide- ranging statement about the war. He acknowledged the death 
and destruction Japan visited upon many Asian people, and expressed ‘deepest remorse’ 
and ‘sincere condolences’ for those acts.47 But he did not issue a fresh apology, angering 
 37 Choe Sang- hun, ‘South Korean Court Orders Mitsubishi of Japan to Pay for Forced Wartime Labor’ New York 
Times (29 Nov. 2018).
 38 Lindsay Maizland, ‘The Japan- South Korea Trade Dispute: What to Know’ Council on Foreign Relations: In 
Brief (5 Aug. 2019) (describing the diplomatic fallout occasioned by the Supreme Court decisions).
 39 Ms. Park Yu- ha presented a more complicated picture of the comfort women than has been conventionally 
accepted by mainstream South Korean society. See Choe Sang- hun, ‘Professor Who Wrote of Korean “Comfort 
Women” Wins Defamation Case’ New York Times (25 Jan. 2017). Unconventional accounts of the war have also 
spurred lawsuits in the China and Japan. A Beijing court ordered a Chinese historian to apologize to the sons of 
five war ‘heroes’ whose narratives he had questioned. According to Xinhua, the article both hurt the plaintiffs’ 
feelings and harmed the public’s sense of national identity. See ‘Former magazine chief editor loses WWII- heros 
[sic] slander case’, Xinhua (27 June 2016). In Tokyo, over 8,000 people sued the left- leaning Asahi Shimbun for 
‘spreading erroneous facts to international society’. ‘Thousands of people sue Asahi for articles on wartime sex 
slavery’, San Diego Union- Tribune (27 January 2015).
 40 See Choe Sang- hun, ‘Professor Who Wrote of Korean “Comfort Women” Wins Defamation Case’.
 41 ‘Mitsubishi Materials, Chinese WWII slave workers reach deal’ Chicago Tribune (1 June 2016).
 42 Martin Fackler, ‘Pressure in Japan to Forget Sins of War’ New York Times (28 Oct. 2014).
 43 Former Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro visited Yasukuni six times between 2001 and 2006.
 44 See Chico Harlan, ‘Japanese prime minister’s visit to Yasukuni war shrine adds to tensions in Asia’ Washington 
Post (26 Dec. 2013); Shannon Tiezi, ‘China, South Korea Not Convinced by Abe’s WW2 Anniversary Speech’ 
Diplomat (18 Aug. 2015).
 45 The US embassy said in a statement, ‘[T] he United States is disappointed that Japan’s leadership has taken 
an action that will exacerbate tensions with Japan’s neighbors’. See Embassy of the United States, Tokyo, Japan, 
‘Statement on Prime Minister Abe’s December 26 Visit to Yasukuni Shrine’ (26 December 2013) <https:// japan.
usembassy.gov/ e/ p/ tp- 20131226- 01.html> accessed 20 June 2017.
 46 In 1995, Murayama Tomiichi offered what many consider as the sincerest apology by a Japanese prime min-
ister for the war. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama ‘On 
the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war’s end’ (15 August 1995), <http:// www.mofa.go.jp/ announce/ press/ 
pm/ murayama/ 9508.html> accessed 12 June 2017. In 2005, Koizumi Junichiro offered his own statement. See 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (15 August 2005) <http:// 
www.mofa.go.jp/ announce/ announce/ 2005/ 8/ 0815.html> accessed 15 June 2017.
 47 Justin McCurry, ‘Japanese PM Shinzo Abe stops short of new apology in war anniversary speech’, Guardian 
(14 Aug. 2015).
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Japan’s neighbours.48 The Chinese government declaimed Abe’s insincerity and ambi-
guity.49 South Korea similarly expressed dissatisfaction, albeit in more measured terms.50 
A few weeks after Abe’s public statement, Chinese president Xi Jinping— joined by Russian 
president Vladimir Putin and South Korea’s then- president Park Geun- hye— presided over 
a military parade to commemorate China’s victory over Japan.51
Beneath the political posturing— and under pressure from human rights groups, inter-
national organizations, foreign governments and victims themselves— the Japanese gov-
ernment has tried to address one aspect of the country’s troubled war- time legacy:  the 
‘comfort women’. In 1995, Japan launched the Asian Women’s Fund, which channelled do-
nations from the private sector to former comfort women. The Japanese government pro-
vided funds to cover medical and welfare expenses, but did not contribute to the monetary 
compensation scheme. Several hundred comfort women, mostly from the Philippines, ac-
cepted compensation. The fund provoked strong reactions from South Korean and Dutch 
comfort women, who believed that the compensation did not amount to state redress, as the 
Japanese government still avoided legal responsibility for the war.52
In late 2015, the Japanese and South Korean governments announced they had reached 
a ‘final and irreversible’ agreement on the comfort women issue.53 Prime Minister Abe 
Shinzo offered his ‘most sincere apologies and remorse’. The scheme would provide money 
to surviving South Korean comfort women, and the families of deceased comfort women. 
But sitting South Korean president Moon Jae- in, after convening a commission to look into 
the agreement, formally dissolved the foundation in 2019.54
Outside of officialdom, activists, historians, lawyers, and others have devoted signifi-
cant attention to resolving lingering issues from the war.55 Some comb historical archives 
 48 Ibid.
 49 See e.g. Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hua Chunying’s Remarks on Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 
Statement on the 70th Anniversary of the End of the War, Min. For. Aff. People’s Rep. China (15 Aug. 2015) (‘Japan 
should have made an explicit statement on the nature of the war of militarism and aggression and its responsi-
bility on the wars, made sincere apology to the people of victim countries, and made a clean break with the past of 
militarist aggression, rather than being evasive on this major issue of principle’), available at <http:// www.fmprc.
gov.cn/ mfa_ eng?xwfw_ 665399/ s2510_ 665401/ 2535_ 665405/ t1288969.shtml> accessed 15 Aug. 2017. See also 
‘Abe’s watered- down apology fails sincerity test’ Xinhua (14 Aug. 2015). (calling Abe’s speech a ‘retrogression from 
the 1995 statement’ by Prime Minister Murayama, <http:// www.chinadaily.com.cn/ world/ 2015- 08/ 14/ content_ 
21604800.htm> accessed 15 Aug. 2017.
 50 South Korean President Park Geun- hye noted Abe’s statement ‘did not quite live up to our expectations’. 
See Commemorative Address by President Park Geun- hye on the 70th Anniversary of Liberation, Republic of 
Korea Cheong Wa Dae (15 Aug. 2017), <http:// english1.president.go.kr/ activity/ speeches.php?srh%5bboard_ 
no%5d=24&srh%5bview_ mode%5d=detail&srh%5bseq%5d=11748&srh%5bdetail_ no%5d=43> accessed 15 
Aug. 2017. Likewise, the Korea minister of foreign affairs urged ‘the Japanese government to make proactive efforts 
to resolve as soon as possible the pending historical issues between the ROK and Japan, including that concerning 
the sexual slavery victims of Japan’s Imperial Army during World War II’.
 51 See Tom Phillips, ‘China military parade shows might as Xi Jinping pledges 300,000 cut in army’ Guardian (3 
Sept. 2015).
 52 Stephanie Wolfe, The Politics of Reparations and Apologies (Springer 2013) 264.
 53 The agreement would include an apology by Japanese prime minister Abe Shinzo, and the establishment of a 
1 billion yen (8 million euro) fund to care for elderly comfort women.
 54 Kyodo News, ‘South Korea formally closes Japan- funded “comfort women” foundation’ Japan Times (5 
July 2019).
 55 Franziska Seraphim, War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945– 2005 (Harvard East Asian Press 2009) 
(outlining the contributions of various civil society groups to the proper commemoration of the war dead, ma-
nipulation of national symbols and the teaching of history).
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to uncover how the Japanese government planned and executed campaigns or policies.56 
Others have held mock trials to flesh out the historical, moral, and legal treatment of Japan’s 
war- time conduct.57 Still others rally by the thousands to ensure Japan’s pacifist constitution 
remains intact.58 As we will see below, litigation has provided an additional track to hold the 
Japanese government, and corporate sector, to account.
V. Litigation After War
Courts have played a key role in reconciling World War II. The most famous of these are 
the Nuremberg Tribunal (1946– 1947) and Tokyo Tribunal (1946– 1948). In addition, many 
countries, including China, Netherlands, and Russia, held domestic military tribunals to 
try Japanese war criminals within their jurisdiction.59 Yet, as with any post- conflict judi-
cial mechanism, these tribunals selectively examined the war.60 Many crimes, from the 
institutionalized rape of the comfort women, to the use of human subjects in medical ex-
perimentation, were either overlooked or inadequately addressed. Moreover, some of the 
harm— radiation sickness from the US bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, unexploded 
ordnance left by the Japanese Army in Manchuria— emerged only years or decades after the 
war. Given advances in human rights and humanitarian law, as well as just war theory, a re-
think of World War II’s remedial mechanisms is both timely and necessary.
Lawsuits have long probed Japan’s role, responsibility, and remediation efforts for the 
war.61 In the 1950s and 1960s, survivors of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki sued the 
Japanese government for waiving their rights to seek compensation from the US govern-
ment in the San Francisco Peace Treaty.62 The Tokyo District Court determined that the 
bombing of Nagasaki violated international law; but it also held individuals did not have 
the standing to sue governments for violations of international law, a holding with signifi-
cant consequences for subsequent lawsuits.63 In the 1970s and 1980s, plaintiffs from former 
 56 The best- known example is Professor Yoshimi Yoshiaki’s discovery, in the library of Japan’s Defense Agency, 
of documents that linked the military with the comfort women stations. See Norimitsu Onishi, ‘In Japan, a 
Historian Stands by Proof of Wartime Sex Slavery’ New York Times (31 Mar 2007). Less well known, Professor 
Kosho Tadashi found a cache of documents about Korean forced labor in the library of his home institution, 
Komazawa University. The documents included, inter alia, a report on Korean forced labour prepared by the gen-
eral affairs division of the Nippon Steel company. See William Underwood, Names, Bones and Unpaid Wages 
(1): Reparations for Korean Forced Labor in Japan, Asia- Pacific Journal / Japan Focus (4 Sept. 2006), available at 
<http:// apjjf.org/ - William- Underwood/ 2219/ article.html> accessed 15 Aug. 2017.
 57 See Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery, (4 Dec. 2001), available at 
<http:// www.iccwomen.org/ wigjdraft1/ Archives/ oldWCGJ/ tokyo/ summary.html> accessed 15 Aug. 2017.
 58 David McNeil, ‘Japan’s pacifist constitution: After 70 years, nation changes the rules so it can go to war’ 
Independent (1 July 2014).
 59 Ling Yan, ‘The 1956 Japanese War Crimes Trials in China’, in Morten Bergsmo, Cheah Wui Ling, and Yi Ping 
(eds), Historical Origins of International Criminal Law (Torkel Opsah Academic EPublisher 2015) 215 (noting 
trials in China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, and Vietnam).
 60 See Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford University Press 2008) 40 (‘[S] ome selectivity is inevitable 
given the large numbers generally implicated in modern state prosecution, scarcity of judicial resources in transi-
tional societies and the high political and other costs of successor trials. Given these constraints, selective or exem-
plary trials, it would seem, can advance a sense of justice’.)
 61 Yasuhiro Okuda, ‘Government Liability for Injuries to Foreign Individuals in Japan’ (2001) 3 Yearbook on 
Private International Law 115, 116.
 62 The plaintiffs posited that, by waiving their rights to seek reparations from the US in the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty, Japan became liable for their medical treatment.
 63 Shimoda v. Japan, translated in (1964) 8 Japanese Annual of International Law 212, 252 (‘The dropping of the 
atomic bombs is a violation of international law, which can be interpreted as a tort under domestic law’).
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colonies Korea and Taiwan64 demanded that the Japanese government extend them the 
same social welfare benefits as those provided to Japanese citizens.65 While the courts gen-
erally did not find in plaintiffs’ favour, the verdicts pressured Japan’s diet (parliament) to 
introduce a new remedial scheme, which it did in 1987.
In the 1990s, World War II litigation entered a new phase. For the first time, victims of 
Japanese war crimes stepped forward to seek compensation, first from the Japanese gov-
ernment, and later from Japanese corporations.66 They have since filed over one hundred 
lawsuits in Japan, China, Korea, the Philippines, and the US, spawning a veritable social 
movement known in Japanese as sengo hoshô soshô (or post- war compensation litigation, 
‘PCL’). The victims include former ‘comfort women’, forced labourers, victims of medical 
experimentation, family members of those killed and maimed during various massacres, as 
well as the heirs of these victims.
For most of the past three decades, Japan has been the epicentre of this movement, with 
over one hundreds cases filed at trial, appellate, and Supreme courts.67 With a few excep-
tions, Japanese verdicts have favoured state and corporate defendants.68 Japanese judges 
tend to dismiss claims either on statutes of limitation (for the corporations) or sovereign 
immunity (for the Japanese government).69 Courts have also invoked post- war treaties to 
deny individuals the individual right to seek compensation. This, of course, obviates the 
possibility of court- ordered restitution, though Japanese courts are by no means unusual 
for dismissing claims in this way.70
But Asian victims have also sought reparations elsewhere. In the US, federal and state 
courts have presided over, and ultimately dismissed, cases brought by comfort women from 
various countries, Korean and Chinese forced labourers, and US prisoners of war.71 In 2010, 
the Philippine Supreme Court dismissed a case brought by Filipina comfort women under 
the political question doctrine.72
 64 Japan gained control of Taiwan after defeating China in the 1895 Sino- Japanese War. Japan formally annexed 
Korea in 1910.
 65 See generally Yuji Iwasawa, International Law, Human Rights and Japanese Law: The Impact of International 
Law on Japanese Law (Oxford University Press 1998) 176– 9. See also Susan Southward, Nagasaki:  Life After 
Nuclear War (Penguin 2015) 225 (describing the efforts of Korean atomic bomb survivors to obtain medical care 
and compensation).
 66 See Tanaka Hiroshi, Nakayama Taketoshi, and Arimitsu Ken, ‘Sengo Hoshô Nokosareta Kadai [Remaining 
Challenges in Postwar Compensation]’, in Tanaka Hiroshi, Nakayama Taketoshi, and Arimitsu Ken (eds), 
Mikaiketsu no Sengo Hoshô: Towareru Nihon no Kako to Mirai [Unresolved War Compensation: Questioning Japan’s 
Past & Future] (Soshisha 2012) 8, 15 (noting over seventy cases filed since 1990). In an appendix, the authors enu-
merate ninety post- war compensation lawsuits, eighty- one of which have been filed since 1990. Ibid. 208– 13.
 67 Igarashi Masahiro, ‘Nihon no “Sengo Hoshô Saiban” to Kokusaihô’ [Japan’s ‘Postwar Compensation 
Lawsuits’ and International Law] (2006) 105 Kokusaihô Gaikô Zasshi [Journal International Law & International 
Relations] 1, 12.
 68 The lawsuits began in Japan in the early 1990s. Since that time, war victims have filed suits in China, Korea, 
and the US. Korean courts have found Japan liable in two recent decisions.
 69 See Timothy Webster ‘Sisyphus in a Coalmine’ (2006) 91 Cornell Law Review 733, 750.
 70 See Burger- Fischer v. Degussa AG (n 2).
 71 Taiheiyo Cement Co. v.  Superior Court of Los Angeles [2004] Cal. Ct App. (dismissing claims brought by 
Korean forced labourer because California statute allowing World War II claims was unconstitutional); Hwang 
Geum Joo v.  Japan [2003] DC Cir. (dismissing comfort women’s claims against Japan on sovereign immunity 
grounds); Re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation [2001] ND Cal. (striking down California statute 
permitted World War II claims); Mitsubishi Materials Co. v. Dillman [2003] Cal. Ct App. (post- war treaty waived 
US prisoner of war’s claims against Japanese corporation).
 72 Vinuya v. Romulo [2010] GR No. 162230 (dismissing case as a political question: one whose resolution falls 
to the executive branch, not the judicial branch). The decision is available at <http:// sc.judiciary.gov.ph/ jurispru-
dence/ 2010/ april2010/ 162230.htm> (last visited 20 June 2017).
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In 2007, the Supreme Court of Japan rendered two decisions that foreclosed the possi-
bility of individual compensation from Japanese courts, at least for certain types of claims.73 
These decisions have not completely halted the flow of lawsuits in Japan,74 but have encour-
aged victims to sue elsewhere. Indeed, following a monumental decision rendered by the 
Korean Supreme Court in 2012, Korea has now become the hotspot of World War II litiga-
tion in Asia. As of May 2017, at least fourteen lawsuits are wending their way through the 
Korean judiciary.75 Meanwhile, in China, a Beijing court accepted the country’s first World 
War II lawsuit in March 2014.76 This ultimately produced a large settlement with defendant 
Mitsubishi Materials in June 2016.77
These experiences suggest a role for courts in remediating the harms of war, and ensuring 
legal peace— both central aims of jus post bellum. This is not necessarily a straightforward con-
tribution; like many legal arguments, caveats apply. Let me address three. First, nationality, 
of courts and litigants, clearly matters. Japanese courts were largely unresponsive to claims 
brought by Chinese and Korean plaintiffs against Japanese corporations or the Japanese gov-
ernment. Conversely, Korean courts, following the 2012 decision, have shown far more sym-
pathy to Korean victims suing Japanese corporations. While courts supposedly apply law in a 
dispassionate manner, the extraordinary political sensitivities raised by these lawsuits have led 
courts to jettison impartiality.
Second, the success of litigation in effectuating a damages award is hardly assured. Scores of 
lawsuits failed, including some brought in Korea, before one succeeded. In addition, nearly half 
a century elapsed between the end of the war (1945) and the filing of the first lawsuit (1990), and 
another two decades between that first case and the first unequivocal victory (2012). A seven- 
decade wait is hardly optimal. But it does point out the importance of the passage of time; a gen-
eration or two may be needed before a state can grapple with its own historic atrocities.
Third, domestic courts may prefer to keep a low profile in war crimes litigation. 
Separation of powers situates the authority to lead and conduct wars firmly in the political 
branches. Simply put, judges are reluctant to evaluate war policy, or its execution. It is gen-
erally quite rare that civilian judges weigh in on the conduct of war at all. Moreover, in the 
transnational context, judicial modesty may be appropriate. When sensitive issues of inter-
national affairs are at stake, particularly acts of foreign states (or acts coordinated by foreign 
 73 Both decisions, using identical language, found that the 1972 Japan– China Joint Communique waived all 
individual claims brought by Chinese citizens. See Mark A. Levin, ‘International Decisions: Nishimatsu Const. 
v. Song Jixiao’ (2008) 102 American Journal International Law 148.
 74 For example, Chinese forced labourers sued the Japanese government in 2015 for abducting, trans-
porting, and forcing them into labour at a mine in Akita prefecture. See Horikawa Takuya, ‘Kyôsei Renkô Kuni 
o Teiso:  Chûgokujinra 13- rin Baishô Motome’ [Thirteen Chinese Sue the State for Forced Labour, Seeking 
Compensation] Mainichi Shimbun (27 June 2015).
 75 See Kung- nae Kang- je Dongweon Sonhe Pesang Sosong Hyeonhwang- p’o [Chart on Current Status of Forced 
Labour Lawsuits in Korea], International Conference to Seek a Comprehensive Solution to the Problem of Japan’s 
Forced Mobilization, 23, available at <https:// www.minjok.or.kr/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2017/ 05/ 170530- > accessed 
27 July 2017.
 76 Chinese plaintiffs filed the first compensation lawsuits in Hebei and Shandong provinces as early as 2000. 
But the courts did not accept them. In February 2014, victims filed another lawsuit against Mitsubishi Materials 
and Nippon Coke (formerly Mitsui Mitsui), which the Beijing Intermediate Court accepted on 18 March 2014. 
Numerous class actions were then filed in Beijing and Hebei Province. Shuhei Yamada, ‘True Face of Chinese 
plaintiffs seeking wartime compensation for forced labor’ Nikkei Asian Review (16 May 2014).
 77 Austin Ramzy, ‘Mitsubishi Materials Apologized to Chinese World War II Laborers’ New York Times (Hong 
Kong, 1 June 2016).
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states), the executive branch may be the preferred state actor.78 How, then, can the judiciary 
contribute to peace after war?79
First, it is possible that courts will find for plaintiffs, and order remediation. A handful 
of decisions in Japan, all of which were overturned ultimately on appeal, bear this out. 
Similarly, recent decisions in South Korea also have found for plaintiffs. Given the individu-
alistic nature of litigation, pitting this particular victim against that particular corporation, 
courts can provide an ad hoc remedy to this set of plaintiffs. But a global settlement typically 
requires the involvement of the political branches, which have thus far been unable to get 
involved to any great extent.
Of course, even ‘victorious’ plaintiffs may express dissatisfaction with the verdict. In 
1998, a Japanese trial court found against the Japanese government and ordered it to pay 
each of three former comfort women 300,000 yen in compensation (about US$3,000). This 
is the only decision in Japan to find for the comfort women, and for that reason attracted 
significant media and scholarly attention.80 Plaintiffs, however, were far from satisfied. They 
believed Japan still owed them a ‘proper apology and compensation’, and that the amount 
of money was an insult to their suffering.81 As plaintiff Yi Sun- dok explained, ‘From ages 17 
to 25, I was subjected to unspeakable acts. 300,000 yen— is that some kind of joke?’82 Thus, 
we cannot say that winning the case will necessarily restore the victims. In other lawsuits, 
however, plaintiffs have stated that the verdict restored some piece of their human dignity.83
Second, litigation can be empowering. Individual victims can seek justice from the 
entities that tormented them, whether state or corporate, and caused immense physical, 
psychological, physiological, and emotional harm. They need not rely on their government 
to act on their behalf. Instead, the victim can assert agency and take action against the en-
tity that caused such harm. Even if the lawsuit does not return a favourable verdict, the 
lawsuit itself constitutes an ‘exercise in self- determination’.84 As former comfort woman 
Chen Yabian told a press conference shortly after losing her compensation lawsuit, ‘Japan 
acknowledges the bad things that the Army did on Hainan Island, like raping women. Why 
 78 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabatino, 376 US 423 (1964) (precluding US courts ‘from inquiring into the val-
idity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory’); Lee Keun- 
Gwan, ‘Han- Il Ch’eonggugweon Hyeopjeong- sang Kangje Chingyong Paesang Ch’eonggugweon Ch’eori- e Taehan 
Kukje Peopjeok Keomto’ [The Question of Individual Claims of the Korean Victims of Forced Labour Under the 
1965 Claims Settlement Agreement between Korea and Japan from International Law Perspective] (2013) 54 Seoul 
Law Journal 327, 381– 2 (arguing for judicial restraint in sensitive cases such as the 2012 decision rendered by the 
Korean Supreme Court).
 79 Stuart Eizenstat, who held key positions in the commerce, state and treasury departments during the Clinton 
administration, played a pivotal role in getting European governments and corporations to set up settlement 
funds. A lawyer by training, Eizenstat criticized ‘the inadequacies of the American legal system to resolve complex 
political issues. U.S. courts are not the best places to resolve profound historical and political questions’. He cited 
procedural complexity, evidentiary rules, ‘obdurate judges,’ and various types of delays as the most pressing prob-
lems with litigation. Stuart Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice (Perseus Books 2003) 341.
 80 The decision was translated into English, and appeared in many English language newspapers. See Teihei 
Okada (trans.), ‘The “Comfort Women” Case:  Judgment of April 27, 1998 Shimonoseki Branch, Yamaguchi 
Prefectural Court, Japan’ (1999) 8 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 63.
 81 See Comfort Women: Japan, Pusan Comfort Women and Women’s Labor Corps members, Filed, 25 Dec. 
1992, Memory and Reconciliation in the Asia- Pacific, available at <https:// www.gwu.edu/ ~memory/ data/ judicial/ 
comfortwomen_ japan/ pusan.html> accessed 19 May 2019.
 82 See ‘Kanpu Soshô no Hanketsu:  Hanbun no Ryôshin’ [Verdict in Pusan Litigation:  A Half Measure of 
Conscience] Kyodo News (5 May 1998).
 83 One victorious plaintiff, Zhang Lianxin, said ‘This is great, this is great. All the pain and toil we endured in 
Japan has finally paid off. No matter what you may say, there is still justice in this world’. Dai Xiaolin, ‘Zhongguo 
Laogong Shouhaizhe Lüshi: Women Huode le Quanmian Shengsu’ [Chinese Forced Labor Lawyer: We Got a 
Complete Victory] Beijing Zhenbao [Beijing Morning News] (27 Mar. 2004) (describing the reaction of plaintiffs, 
family members and the lawyers of a case against a Japanese transportation company).
 84 Beth Van Schaack, ‘With All Deliberate Speed: Civil Human Rights Litigation as a Tool for Social Change’ 
(2004) 57 Vanderbilt Law Review 2318.
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doesn’t Japan give us compensation? Why does Japan not apologize to us?’85 When re-
porters pressed her on the difficulty of winning in civil litigation, Chen replied ‘the Japanese 
government has superficially admitted its atrocities. But no matter what the Japanese courts 
decide, I will keep on suing’.86
Third, lawsuits often generate significant media attention. This raises awareness among the 
public, which may pressure companies and governments to assume a more conciliatory pos-
ture vis- à- vis victims. During the discovery period of civil litigation, plaintiffs’ attorneys may un-
earth new information about the underlying human rights abuses. For example, in 1998 lawsuits 
against the German subsidiary of Ford Motor Company, lawyers discovered a 1945 US Army 
report calling it ‘the arsenal of Nazism’ for its manufacture of war material.87 The report also 
contradicted Ford’s justification that it had ‘lost all contact’ with its German subsidiary in 1941.
In other words, litigation helps set the factual record straight.88 In Europe, many coun-
tries have criminalized Holocaust denial, and prosecuted people who have published ac-
counts that deny historical facts. Japan has no such laws, and a more contested relationship 
with the factual basis of World War II. Japanese politicians, including current prime min-
ister Abe Shinzo, have made numerous statements either denying Japan’s role in wartime 
atrocities, or downplaying the severity of these crimes.89 Not that Japan is alone in this situ-
ation. Members of many post- conflict societies subscribe to an interpretation of history that 
differs radically from that of their neighbours’, or former enemies, or from basic reality. The 
contemporary Balkan states epitomize this interpretive fragmentation. Each ethnic group 
‘has its own ethnic truth— an interpretation of the past that is enslaved to dominant inter-
ests and thereby has perpetuated the conflict. The fierce political battle between competing 
truths, memories and ethnic identities has intensified in the past decade’.90 Given the mul-
tiple truths at stake, trials can play a role here in fact- finding, and truth- assertion, though 
the success of such efforts is by no means assured. The ICTY provides a cautionary tale. 
Particularly in Serbia, where ‘denialism is mainstream’, the tribunal ‘failed to persuade the 
relevant target populations that the findings in its judgments are true’.91
In Japan, judges pen elaborate factual findings in their opinions. Given the contested dis-
cursive terrain that surrounds Japanese discussions of World War II, the judicial opinions 
provide a factual anchor in the quicksand of historical memory. Japanese courts have found 
that the Japanese Army was involved in the abduction, transportation, and forcible rape of 
the comfort women, as well as taking measures to ensure their hygiene.92 Other opinions 
have assiduously outlined Japan’s slave labour programme, rescuing it from historical ob-
scurity and cultural amnesia.93 In light of the Japanese government’s wilful attempts to alter 
 85 Wang Xinli, ‘Hainan “Weianfu” Yuangao Huiguo: Guansi Shu le Hai Zai Gao’ [Hainan “Comfort Women” 
Plaintiff Returns Home: Lost the Suit But Will Appeal], Xinhua (2 Sept. 2006).
 86 Ibid.
 87 Ken Silverstein, ‘Ford and the Fuhrer’ The Nation (24 Jan. 2010).
 88 See Holder (n 9) 248– 9.
 89 See Timothy Webster, ‘Discursive Justice’ (2018) 50 New  York University Journal of International Law & 
Policy 1261.
 90 Elazar Barkan and Belma Becirbasic, ‘The Politics of Memory, Victimization and Activism in Postconflict 
Bosnia & Herzegovina’, in Klaus Neumann and Janna Thompson (eds), Historical Justice & Memory (Wisconsin 
2015) 95, 98.
 91 Marko Milanovic, ‘The Impact of the ICTY on the Former Yugoslavia: An Anticipatory Post Mortem’ (2016) 
110 American Journal of International Law 213.
 92 Ha Sun- nyo et al. v. Japan. An English translation is available at Taihei Okada (trans.), ‘The ‘Comfort Women’ 
Case: Judgment of April 27, 1998, Shimonoseki Branch, Yamaguchi Prefectural Court, Japan’ (1999) 8 Pacific Rim 
Law & Policy Journal 64, 68
 93 Cai Shujing v. Mitsui Mining Co., 1098 Hanrei Taimuzu 267 (Fukuoka D. Ct, 26 Apr. 2002).
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history, by claiming reports were lost (when in fact they were simply hidden in government 
archives), litigation can help concretize the past.
Fourth, civil litigation brings legal judgment to historical events. Judges determine 
whether state conduct violated domestic and international law, reinserting the voice of 
reason into the chaos of war. As Lawrence Douglas has argued about Nuremburg, trials can 
‘both show the world the facts of astonishing crimes, and demonstrate the power of law to 
reintroduce order into a space evacuated of legal and moral sense’.94
In the post- war compensation lawsuits, Japanese judges have found that the state and 
corporate sector violated domestic tort and contract law, as well as international treaty and 
customary international law. Such niceties may mean little to victims, who would prefer 
apologies and damage awards. But lawyers and scholars take note. Even in robust democra-
cies, courts rarely hold that their militaries or executive branches violated domestic law, to 
say nothing of international law.95 So when a court finds its own government violated inter-
national humanitarian law or international human rights law, it helps end impunity, right a 
historical wrong, and bend the world, however slightly, to the arc of justice.
VI. Conclusion
Civil litigation— with its focus on individual grievances, rules of evidence, and procedural 
complexity— may not provide the ideal forum to resolve complicated issues of remediation 
after armed conflict. But in the absence of political will by state actors— the ones that would 
set up a tribunal, or a claims commission— litigation can make a positive and incremental 
contribution to peace. Attention to victims’ suffering, damage to property, and fidelity to 
facts, elude many post- conflict societies.
Civil litigation can address, if not redress, some of these concerns. The judicial opinion 
renders a version of events that might contradict or challenge revisionist narratives es-
poused by political classes, especially if those classes remain in power. Or an opinion can 
lend credence to denialist accounts by either not finding facts, or finding them in a particu-
larly tendentious manner. Civil suits assign blame— even if indirectly— by holding certain 
conduct tortious, or finding a state violated international law. It can empower individuals 
to work through the violence and trauma of war, giving an officially sanctioned platform to 
discuss events that have been ignored, suppressed, or repressed.
Given the numerous historical, legal, and moral omissions that haunt post- conflict so-
cieties, civil litigation has helped write, rewrite, and reinforce the legacies of the war. To 
be sure, litigation could also catalyze a broader conversation about reparation among state 
actors in East Asia, as the Holocaust litigation did for Europe and the US. But given a more 
nationalist political class in Japan, and the disinterest of US government actors, civil litiga-
tion may remain the final word on the issues of legal liability, state redress, and individual 
reparation in East Asia for decades to come.
 94 Lawrence Douglas, The Memory of Judgment: Making Law and History in the Trial of the Holocaust (Yale 
2001) 3.
 95 Justice Rehnquist found the forcible abduction of a Mexican national, by the US Drug Enforcement Agency, 
did not violate an extradition treaty between the two countries. See United States v. Alvarez- Machain, 504 US 655, 
670 (1992). Justice Stevens took the opposite view in his dissent, calling the abduction a ‘flagrant violation of inter-
national law’. Ibid. 682.
